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I  Introduction 
Biodiversity offsets, a form of environmental compensation, are increasingly being offered 
by developers and taken into account as part of the process for determining planning 
permissions in New Zealand.  This paper outlines the concept of biodiversity offsets and, 
with reference to a case study, the role it currently plays under New Zealand's primary 
planning legislation – the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA).  The paper argues that 
while the current approach to offsets under the RMA is sub-optimal, recent developments of 
the law pertaining to national policy statements provide an opportunity to use biodiversity 
offsets as part of implementing an environmental bottom line for biodiversity and ecosystem 
function loss.   
II  Biodiversity 
This part describes the concept of biodiversity, sets out reasons why protecting biodiversity 
is important and summarises some of New Zealand's policy responses to the issue of 
biodiversity. 
Biological diversity (or "biodiversity") is the variability among living organisms and the 
ecological complexes of which they are part; including diversity within species, between 
species and of ecosystems.1  The preamble of the Convention on Biological Diversity, to 
which New Zealand is a contracting party, notes "the intrinsic value of biological diversity" 
and "the importance of biological diversity for evolution and for maintaining life sustaining 
systems of the biosphere"; while affirming "that the conservation of biological diversity is a 
common concern of humankind".2 
New Zealand's biodiversity is particularly distinctive due to a confluence of ecological 
factors; including the country's geography, location and evolutionary history.  A high 
proportion of New Zealand's remaining biodiversity is endemic — all frogs and reptiles, 
over 90% of insects, 80% of vascular plants, 50% of fungi and 25% of bird species do not 
naturally occur anywhere else.3  Biodiversity has intrinsic, economic and ecological value. 
In the New Zealand context, an aspect of biodiversity's intrinsic value is also world-view of 
the country's indigenous Māori population.  Writing about the relationship of Māori with the 
environment, the Waitangi Tribunal identified as "core values" whanaungatanga (or kinship) 
and kaitiakitanga, which is often translated as guardianship.4  Explaining these concepts 
                                                   
1  Convention on Biological Diversity 1760 UNTS 79 (opened for signature 5 June 1992, entered into 
force 29 December 1993), art 2. 
2  Convention on Biological Diversity, above n 1, at preamble.  
3  New Zealand's Fifth National Report to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity 
(2013) at 5.  See also New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy (February 2000) at 1–4. 
4  Waitangi Tribunal Ko Aotearoa Tenei: Te Taumata Tuatahi – A Report into Claims Concerning 
New Zealand Law and Policy Affecting Maori Culture and Identity (Wai 262, 2011) [Wai 262] at 
105. 
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further, the Waitangi Tribunal endorsed the writings of Rev Māori Marsden, which 
articulated three basic principles that derive from a Māori world view:5 
  Humankind's contribution is to enhance and maintain the life 
supporting systems of Papa-tū-ā-nuku; 
  People should treat Papa-tū-ā-nuku with love and respect in 
recognition of her life-supporting function, her role in the creation of 
the natural world, and her place in our own whakapapa; and 
  We do not own Papa-tū-ā-nuku, but are recipients, and therefore 
stewards, of the natural environment. 
Of some relevance to biodiversity offsetting in particular, the same Waitangi Tribunal report 
observed with respect to the RMA that there has been a lack of guidance from central 
government.  "National policy statements and national environmental standards were 
supposed to provide leadership for councils to follow; instead, in 20 years very few have 
been developed".6 
With respect to the economic and ecological values of biodiversity, ecological systems 
"provide a broad range of essential goods and services to humanity.  They are the life-
support systems for all life on Earth"; and, as a consequence, human well-being and 
prosperity depend upon such "ecosystem services".7  The authors of a recent review of 
biodiversity research published the six "consensus statements", including:8 
• "There is now unequivocal evidence that biodiversity loss reduces the efficiency 
by which ecological communities capture biologically essential resources, produce 
biomass, decompose and recycle biologically essential nutrients." 
• "There is mounting evidence that biodiversity increases the stability of ecosystem 
functions through time." 
• "The impact of biodiversity on any single ecosystem process is nonlinear and 
saturating, such that change accelerates as biodiversity loss increases." 
• "Diverse communities are more productive because they contain key species that 
have a large influence on productivity, and differences in functional traits among 
organisms increase total resource capture." 
Despite the values of biodiversity described above, the species and ecosystems of which 
biodiversity is a measure are under threat, both globally and in New Zealand.  The impact of 
Polynesian and subsequent European arrival in New Zealand has been catastrophic in terms 
of habitat and species loss.  Approximately 63% (by land area) of New Zealand's natural 
                                                   
5  Wai 262, above n 4, at 106 referring to Te Ahukaramū Charles Royal (ed) The Woven Universe: 
Selected Writings of Rev. Māori Marsden (Otaki (NZ), Estate of Rev. Māori Marsden, 2003) at 46. 
6  Wai 262, above n 4, at 118. 
7  Jane Lubchenco “Entering the Century of the Environment: A New Social Contract for Science” 
(1998) 279 Science 491 at 492. 
8  See Bradley J Cardinale and others “Biodiversity loss and its impact on humanity” (2012) 486 
Nature 59 at 59. 
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(pre-human) habitats have been destroyed.9  While approximately one third of the country is 
managed for conservation purposes (proportionately large by international standards), much 
of this land is relatively high-altitude and not representative of the pre-human mix of 
habitats.10  New Zealand's remnant natural habitat has also been significantly changed by 
introduced species (particularly mammals), modifying ecosystem functions and altering the 
composition of indigenous plant and animal communities.  The total number of threatened 
indigenous species increased by 10% between the 2005 and 2008–2011 assessment cycles 
of the New Zealand Threat Classification System.11 
In the face of this, New Zealand has adopted the following goal:12 
 Maintain and restore a full range of remaining natural habitats and ecosystems 
to a healthy functioning state, enhance critically scarce habitats, and sustain the 
more modified ecosystems in production and urban environments; and do what 
else is necessary to maintain and restore viable populations of all indigenous 
species and subspecies across their natural range and maintain their genetic 
diversity. 
With respect to maintaining existing habitats, New Zealand's terrestrial biodiversity is 
managed in two principal ways.  The first is through the inclusion of land in the public or 
private conservation estate (for example, land managed under the Conservation Act 1987, 
Reserves Act 1977 or Queen Elizabeth the Second National Trust Act 1977).  The majority 
of this land is administered by the Department of Conservation (DoC).  The second is 
through laws regulating land use, with the two most important statutes being the Forests Act 
1949 (which, among other things, prohibits the milling of unsustainably harvested 
indigenous timber13) and the RMA.  Such land use controls are important in light of the 
public conservation estate being unrepresentative of the remaining ecosystem types and 
habitats.  The RMA is the principal legislation governing the use of natural resources on 
private land, and it plays a significant role in safeguarding ecosystem functions generally, as 
well as providing for the protection of particular threatened habitats – notably lowland forest 
and wetlands – situated on private land and alongside highly modified environments. 
The RMA makes no mention of biodiversity, although s 6(c) recognises the "protection of 
areas of significant indigenous vegetation and significant habitats of indigenous fauna" as a 
matter of "national importance"; with this having been accepted as a means for addressing 
the loss of biodiversity.14  Further, s 7(d) provides that, in achieving the purpose of the 
RMA, persons exercising powers under it "shall have particular regard to" the "intrinsic 
values of ecosystems".  Given the recognised importance of biodiversity, adverse effects on 
                                                   
9  New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy, above n 3, at 34.  See also Protecting Our Places: Information 
about the Statement of National Priorities for Protecting Rare and Threatened Biodiversity on 
Private Land (Ministry for the Environment, April 2007). 
10  New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy, above n 3, at 6. 
11  Rod Hitchmough Summary of changes to the conservation status of taxa in the 2008–11 New  
Zealand Threat Classification System listing cycle (Department of Conservation, June 2013) at 8.  
12  New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy, above n 3. 
13  Forests Act 1949, s 67D. 
14  Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society Inc v Central Otago District Council EnvC Auckland 
A128/2004, 23 September 2004. 
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it are also relevant to the RMA's purpose set out in s 5 "to promote the sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources". 
III  Biodiversity Offsetting 
This part explains biodiversity offsetting and reviews some of the support for and criticisms 
of the concept in the literature.  It also identifies some of the generally accepted principles 
underpinning biodiversity offsetting.  The significant role that biodiversity offsetting is 
already playing in New Zealand is described, and it is concluded that the concept should be 
better engaged with so that its implementation can be improved.  
New Zealand's indigenous biodiversity can be expected to face continuing threats from 
introduced plant and animal species, increasing population,15 climate change,16 economic 
growth and changing land use.17  Biodiversity offsets provide a tool for responding to these 
threats and, among other things, helping to achieve the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy.   
Environmental compensation, or 'offset', was first formally used in the United States of 
America during the 1970s for mitigating the development and destruction of wetlands.18  
Legislation mandating compensatory biodiversity mechanisms, including offsets, now exists 
in approximately 45 countries.19 
A modern New Zealand definition of biodiversity offset is provided by the Proposed 
National Policy Statement on Indigenous Biodiversity (PNPSIB):20 
 Biodiversity offset means measurable conservation outcomes resulting from 
actions which are designed to compensate for more than minor residual adverse 
effects on biodiversity, where those effects arise from an activity after 
appropriate prevention and mitigation measures have been taken.  The goal of 
biodiversity offsets is to achieve no net loss and preferably a net gain of 
biodiversity on the ground with respect to species composition, habitat structure 
and ecosystem function.  
This is very similar to, and modelled on,21 the definition adopted by the Business and 
Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP),22 which is commonly referred to as best practice 
                                                   
15  Geoff Bascand National Population Projections: 2011(base)–2061 (Statistics New Zealand, 19 
July 2012). 
16  Ministry for the Environment Climate change effects and impacts assessment: A Guidance Manual 
for Local Government (May 2008). 
17  Ministry for the Environment Land: Land Use (Environmental Snapshot, January 2010); and 
Ministry for the Environment Environment New Zealand 2007 (December 2007) at 363. 
18  Shelley Burgin "BioBanking: An environmental scientist's view of the role of biodiversity banking 
offsets in conservation" (2008) 17 Biodivers Conserv 807 at 808.  See also James Salzman and JB 
Ruhl "Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law" (2000) 53 Stan L Rev 607 at 
611. 
19  Joseph W Bull and others “Biodiversity offsets in theory and practice” (2013) 47 Oryx 369 at 369 
citing Madsen and others State of Biodiversity Markets Report: Offset and Compensation 
Programs Worldwide (Forest Trends, 2011). 
20  Ministry for the Environment Proposed National Policy Statement on Indigenous Biodiversity 
(2011) at 3. 
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internationally.  Put more simply, offsets are biodiversity-positive actions intended to 
counterbalance biodiversity-negative development. 
Views on biodiversity offsets are wide-ranging.  They include advocates, such as the BBOP 
and International Council on Mining and Metals;23 contributors to the science, such as New 
Zealand academics who have recently published work on calculating "net present 
biodiversity value" and the design of biodiversity offsets;24 as well as critics. 
There is a significant community of thought that accepts biodiversity offsetting as a tool and 
has relatively settled agreement on matters of principle (although some theoretical problems 
and methodological challenges are acknowledged).  A key concept is the goal of using 
biodiversity offsetting to achieve no net loss of biodiversity on the ground with respect to 
species composition, habitat structure and ecosystem function.  Research commissioned by 
the DoC that has been cited internationally identified the following three "conditions" for 
achieving the objective of "no net loss" of biodiversity:25 
• Losses and gains of biodiversity are comparable in type and amount; 
• Biodiversity gains are additional; and 
• Risks are minimised to ensure lasting biodiversity gains. 
The above conditions are part of a framework for understanding the key ingredients of 
biodiversity offsets (and no net loss) that the same research summarises diagrammatically; a 
copy of which is reproduced as an appendix to this paper.  These conditions are also 
consistent with the principles of biodiversity offsets promoted by the BBOP.26 
Despite the extent of agreement, however, the concept of biodiversity offsetting is not 
entirely without controversy.  Three New Zealand critics have recently argued, on the basis 
of biodiversity's complexity and non-interchangeability, that:27 
Viable biodiversity barter and meaningful biodiversity protection seem 
mutually exclusive.  We can achieve one or the other, but not both.  Although 
compensation and no net loss are laudable ideals, ecological and political 
                                                                                                                                                          
21  Ministry for the Environment Proposed National Policy Statement on Indigenous Biodiversity: 
Evaluation under section 32 of the Resource Management Act 1991 (2011) at 66. 
22  Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme <http://bbop.forest-trends.org>.  
23  The Biodiversity Consultancy Independent report on biodiversity offsets (The International Council 
on Mining and Metals and the International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2012). 
24  Jacob Overton, RTT Stephens and Simon Ferrier "Net Present Biodiversity Value and the Design 
of Biodiversity Offsets" (2013) 42 AMBIO 100. 
25  Toby Gardner and Amrei von Hase Key Ingredients for Biodiversity Offsets to Achieve No Net Loss 
(Department of Conservation, 12 June 2012).  For example, this paper is referred to in the Business 
and Biodiversity Offsets Programme Publications Library <http://bbop.forest-
trends.org/documents/>. 
26  Gardner and von Hase, above n 25, at 4. 
27  Susan Walker and others "Why bartering biodiversity fails" (2009) 2 Conservation Letters 149 at 
155. 
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problems appear intractable, and mean that bartering is likely to accomplish 
more harm than good for biodiversity. 
More generally, a former Environment Court judge has written that "the practice of 
environmental compensation in New Zealand is unsatisfactory in a number of respects" and 
recommended "a cautious approach".28  The fact that such criticisms are not merely 
theoretical is demonstrated by a New Zealand study of 110 examples of ecological 
compensation, which found that, in 97.3% of cases, no scientifically valid objective metric 
had been applied to determine the required offset (although 10 had used area as an informal 
metric).29 
Despite the debate surrounding biodiversity offsetting, it appears to have general support 
within New Zealand.  A recent survey of 116 New Zealand stakeholders summarised its 
findings as follows:30   
 Participants consider the benefits to biodiversity are the chief attraction of 
ecological compensation (49.2% of all responses), with the disadvantages 
mainly relating to the difficulties of practical implementation of the concept.  
Our results also show that 96.5% of participants support the concept fully or to 
a limited extent and most (83%) participants consider that it contributes to 
sustainable management, with significant support (87.9%) for a statutory 
approach. 
Further, biodiversity offsets are already a part of New Zealand's regulatory landscape.  Of 
the 12 projects and roads of "national significance" referred to Boards of Inquiry, and for 
which final or draft decisions exist, 10 took into account proposed biodiversity measures 
described by the applicant as an "offset".  Biodiversity offsets are thus already a part of New 
Zealand's regulatory landscape. 
The legitimacy of consent authorities taking biodiversity offsets into account has also been 
confirmed by the High Court in Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand 
Inc v Buller District Council (Buller Coal);31 concerning an appeal from the Environment 
Court in relation to the "Escarpment Mine Project". 
The PNPSIB was also released for consultation in 2011.  While it has not been finalised or 
promulgated yet, the PNPSIB includes as a policy:32 
 In addition to the inclusion in plans of any other provisions that the plan has or 
is required to have relating to section 6(c) of the Act, local authorities must 
manage the effects of activities through district and relevant regional plans (or 
be satisfied that the effects are managed by methods outside of district or 
regional plans) to ensure 'no net loss' of biodiversity of areas of significant 
indigenous vegetation and significant habitats of indigenous fauna by:  
                                                   
28  Ali Memon and Peter Skelton "The Practice of Environmental Compensation Under the Resource 
Management Act 1991" (2004) 8 NZJ Envtl L 177 at 178. 
29  Marie A Brown and others "Compensating for ecological harm: The state of play in New Zealand" 
(2014) 38 New Zealand Journal of Ecology 139 at 144. 
30  MA Brown and others “Implementing ecological compensation in New Zealand: Stakeholder 
perspectives and a way forward” (2014) 44 Journal of the Royal Society of New Zealand 34 at 34. 
31  Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc v Buller District Council [2013] 
NZHC 1346, [2013] NZRMA 293. 
32  Proposed National Policy Statement on Indigenous Biodiversity, above n 20, at 6. 
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 a.  avoiding adverse effects  
 b.  where adverse effects cannot be avoided, ensuring remediation  
 c.  where adverse effects cannot be remedied, ensuring mitigation  
 d.  where adverse effects cannot be adequately mitigated, ensuring any 
residual adverse effects that are more than minor, are offset in 
accordance with the principles set out in Schedule 2.  
 For the avoidance of doubt, in accordance with the principles of Schedule 2, 
there are limits to what can be offset because some vegetation or habitat and 
associated ecosystems, is vulnerable or irreplaceable.  In such circumstances 
off-setting will not be possible and local authorities will need to take full 
account of residual adverse effects in decision-making processes. 
Local authorities are also incorporating concepts of biodiversity offsetting into planning 
instruments under the RMA.  Following an appeal to the Environment Court,33 the 
Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council's "One Plan" includes a policy that makes offsets 
potentially relevant to consent applications for resource use activities in "rare", "threatened" 
and "at-risk" habitats.34  Wellington Regional Council's Regional Freshwater Plan for the 
Wellington Region explains that remedying or mitigating the adverse effects of developing 
Transmission Gully "can include the concept of offsetting".35  
The DoC has also been investigating biodiversity offsetting, which suggests future support 
for the concept.  In 2009 the DoC was funded by the Cross-Departmental Research Pool to 
investigate the feasibility of biodiversity offsetting in New Zealand, and it has prepared 
draft Guidance on Best Practice Biodiversity Offsetting in New Zealand.36 
Putting aside the arguments of those who reject the utility of biodiversity offsetting 
altogether, the key issues emerging from the literature are:37 
• Timing: there can be a temporal gap between development impacts occurring and 
the benefits associated with the offset scheme accruing.  This results in significant 
uncertainty and may fail to account for factors such as the population dynamics of 
threatened species.38 
• Security: further uncertainty results from potential non-compliance with offset 
requirements.  The scientific validity of offsets is dependent upon a robust 
regulatory framework that is able to secure promised actions. 
                                                   
33  Day v Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council [2012] NZEnvC 182. 
34  Proposed Manawatu-Wanganui Regional One Plan, policy 12-5. 
35  Wellington Regional Freshwater Plan, policy 4.2.33A. 
36  Department of Conservation Biodiversity Offsets Programme update (August 2012). 
37  See for example Bull and others, above n 19, and Martine Maron and others “Faustian bargains? 
Restoration realities in the context of biodiversity offset policies” (2012) 155 Biological 
Conservation 141. 
38  See also Sarah A Bekessy and others “The biodiversity bank cannot be a lending bank” (2010) 3 
Conservation letters 151. 
 Biodiversity offsets_long version_1456214_1 (2).DOCX 8 
 
• Measurability (or "currency"): there "exists no single metric that objectively 
captures the full extent of biodiversity, which itself has no universal, unambiguous 
definition.  Any measure of biodiversity is therefore a proxy.  However, offsets 
ostensibly rely upon the accurate quantification of losses and gains, and therefore 
require robust metrics."39  The concept of poor measurability and the technical 
difficulty of assessing ecological outcomes also encompasses problems around 
equivalency (the comparative biodiversity value of the proposed offset), 
additionality (confidence that the offset is not simply displacing other conservation 
effort) and assessing whether the planned outcomes of a particular offset have 
been achieved. 
• Thresholds: while it is generally accepted the offsetting is not an appropriate 
response in every circumstance, articulating thresholds beyond which offsetting 
will not be acceptable is challenging. 
If it is accepted that those aspects of the environment of which biodiversity is a measure will 
remain under pressure from development, and that simple preservation is not practically or 
politically achievable, then it is suggested that biodiversity offsetting (despite its current 
imperfections) is a useful tool for working towards the goal of no net biodiversity loss.  At 
the very least, biodiversity offsetting provides a forum for engaging with the question of 
what should be done in response to proposed habitat destruction. 
IV  The Role of Biodiversity Offsetting Under the RMA  
Part III concluded that biodiversity offsets are already part of New Zealand's regulatory 
landscape.  This section examines the role that biodiversity offsetting currently plays under 
the RMA to provide context for the case study in part V.  While Buller Coal has clarified 
the statutory basis for taking biodiversity offsets into account as part of RMA decision-
making processes, it is suggested that the degree to which such measures should and do 
influence outcomes remains uncertain. 
A development that will have significant adverse effects on biodiversity is likely to require 
consent under the RMA before it can proceed, although ultimately this will depend on the 
relevant regional and district rules promulgated by regional councils and territorial 
authorities, respectively.40  For activities categorised as either "discretionary" or "non-
complying", a consent authority has discretion to either refuse or grant an application for 
consent (and, if granted, to impose conditions under s 108).41  The key decision-making 
provision is s 104:42 
 104  Consideration of applications 
 (1)  When considering an application for a resource consent and any 
submissions received, the consent authority must, subject to Part 2, 
have regard to— 
                                                   
39  Bull and others, above n 19, at 371 (citations omitted). 
40  Resource Management Act 1991, s 9. 
41  Resource Management Act 1991, s 104B. 
42  (Emphasis added.) 
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(a)  any actual and potential effects on the environment of 
allowing the activity; and 
(b)  any relevant provisions of— 
 (i)  a national environmental standard: 
 (ii)  other regulations: 
 (iii)  a national policy statement: 
 (iv)  a New Zealand coastal policy statement: 
 (v)  a regional policy statement or proposed regional 
policy statement: 
 (vi)  a plan or proposed plan; and 
(c) any other matter the consent authority considers relevant 
and reasonably necessary to determine the application. 
Part 2 of the RMA sets out its purpose and principles, including the "lodestar" of s 5:43 
 5 Purpose  
 (1) The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable management of 
natural and physical resources. 
 (2) In this Act, sustainable management means managing the use, 
development, and protection of natural and physical resources in a 
way, or at a rate, which enables people and communities to provide 
for their social, economic, and cultural wellbeing and for their health 
and safety while— 
(a) Sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources 
(excluding minerals) to meet the reasonably foreseeable 
needs of future generations; and 
(b) Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, 
soil, and ecosystems; and 
(c) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of 
activities on the environment. 
When applying the above statutory framework, Buller Coal reviewed the precedents for 
taking environmental compensation and biodiversity offsets into account, before finding 
that:44 
… offsets do not directly mitigate any adverse effects of the activities coming 
with the resource consents on the environment.  … Rather, they offer a positive 
new effect, one which did not exist there before. 
While this could be criticised as dwelling on semantics, it is consistent with the BBOP 
mitigation hierarchy principle, which provides that a biodiversity offset "is a commitment to 
compensate for significant residual adverse impacts on biodiversity identified after 
appropriate avoidance, minimisation and on-site rehabilitation measures have been taken".45  
                                                   
43  Lee v Auckland City Council [1995] NZRMA 241 at 13. 
44  Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc v Buller District Council, above n 
31, at [72]. 
45  Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme To No Net Loss and Beyond: An Overview of the 
Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (2013) at 6 (emphasis added). 
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In other words, biodiversity offsets should not absolve a development from the duty to 
directly mitigate its effects to the extent possible. 
The High Court then accepted that the biodiversity offsets proposed by the applicant were 
"relevant considerations to be weighed in favour of the application by reason of s 104(1)(a) 
and (c), and s 5(2)".46  In other words, offsets must be taken into account when evaluating 
the overall effects on the environment of allowing the activity and whether it promotes the 
statutory purpose of sustainable management.  (Whether the proposed measures in Buller 
Coal ought to have been treated as biodiversity offsets in the true sense of being consistent 
with the generally accepted principles is a separate issue.)  Buller Coal has since been 
followed by the Board of Inquiry in relation to the Tukituki Catchment Proposal.47 
Despite an increasing body of science and policy work on biodiversity offsets, there is, 
however, no robust or consistent framework for how they should be taken into account and 
what weight they should be given in a RMA context.  The available jurisprudence is also 
limited.  While a number of decisions discuss competing evidence on the value of proposed 
biodiversity offsets, the bases of the decision-makers' findings and the roles played by 
proposed offsets in reaching substantive decisions are less clear. 
V  Case Study – the Escarpment Mine Project 
A  Background 
Buller Coal concerned an application for consent under the RMA to establish and operate an 
open-cast coal mine on 157 hectares on the Denniston Plateau – land predominantly held by 
the DoC.  The proposed activities were assessed as discretionary for the purpose of s 104B. 
The applicant conceded that it would be impossible to completely avoid, remedy or mitigate 
the adverse effects of mining; but offered an "offset mitigation and compensation package" 
that it contended would more than offset the residual adverse effects of the proposal.48 
With respect to the ecological values of the site, the Environment Court concluded that, 
overall:49 
… there can be no doubt of the high level of significance of the Denniston 
Plateau for its vegetation and as habitat for native fauna in a variety of forms 
and for the diversity of the plateau as an ecological assemblage. 
This included findings of rare ecosystems,50 various threatened and at-risk species of plants 
and animals51 (including one plant possibly endemic to the plateau),52 as well as significant 
scientific uncertainty.53 
                                                   
46  Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc v Buller District Council, above n 
31, at [78]. 
47  Board of Inquiry into the Tukituki Catchment Proposal Draft Report and Decisions (April 2014) at 
[1083]–[1086]. 
48  West Coast Environmental Network Inc v West Coast Regional Council [2013] NZEnvC 47 at [22]. 
49  West Coast Environmental Network Inc v West Coast Regional Council, above n 48, at [87]. 
50  West Coast Environmental Network Inc v West Coast Regional Council, above n 48, at [51]. 
51  West Coast Environmental Network Inc v West Coast Regional Council, above n 48, at [52]–[80]. 
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While the applicant proposed rehabilitating the site following mining, "in addition to the 
biodiversity loss that would remain evident when the site appears to be fully rehabilitated", 
the "temporary" effects would, in some respects, extend for centuries.54 
The biodiversity offsets offered by the applicant were: 
• A 35 year weed and animal pest control programme covering 10,000 hectares 
(plus a buffer zone) of land within the Kahurangi National Park associated with 
the Heaphy River; with the principal method being the aerial application of 1080 
poison;55 
• A 50 year weed and animal pest control programme covering 4,500 hectares of the 
Denniston Plateau and surrounding land; and 
• Providing permanent legal protection from open cast mining for 745 hectares of 
the Denniston Plateau. 
The Environment Court assessed these offsets in the conventional way by applying JF 
Investments Ltd v Queenstown Lakes District Council.56  At the heart of the Environment 
Court's decision are findings that, "on the balance of probabilities", the proposed offsets 
would "largely mitigate the adverse effects of the proposal on fauna on the mine site",57 and 
that:58 
Overall this case [was] quite finely balanced … So finely balanced indeed that 
while [the Environment Court's] present inclination [was] to grant consent, 
much [would] ultimately turn on whether appropriate conditions [could] be 
worked out and whether some others [could] be offered by the applicant on an 
Augier (volunteered) basis …   
The Environment Court's factual finding that the proposed offsets would mitigate the 
adverse effects on fauna can be criticised, particularly given the fine balance it was 
presented with.  Indeed, the Environment Court explicitly rejected the parties' attempts to 
move from qualitative and subjective assessment to a quantitative approach based on the 
internationally recognised BBOP.59  The degree to which the offsets were factored into the 
"overall broad judgement of whether [the] proposal [would] promote the sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources",60 despite its impact on significant 
                                                                                                                                                          
52  West Coast Environmental Network Inc v West Coast Regional Council, above n 48, at [54]. 
53  For example, West Coast Environmental Network Inc v West Coast Regional Council, above n 48, 
at [72]. 
54  West Coast Environmental Network Inc v West Coast Regional Council, above n 48, at [152]. 
55  Sodium fluoroacetate. 
56  JF Investments Ltd v Queenstown Lakes District Council EnvC Christchurch C48/06, 27 April 
2006 at [42]. 
57  West Coast Environmental Network Inc v West Coast Regional Council, above n 48, at [325]. 
58  West Coast Environmental Network Inc v West Coast Regional Council, above n 48, at [335]. 
59  Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme, above n 22. 
60  West Coast Environmental Network Inc v West Coast Regional Council, above n 48, at [333], 
referring to New Zealand Rail Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1994] NZRMA 70. 
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indigenous vegetation, is also unclear from the reasons for the Environment Court's 
decision. 
B  Discussion 
It is suggested that the Escarpment Mine Project biodiversity offsets would have failed to 
meet the principles developed by the BBOP, had they been applied.  In other words, the 
proposed measures would not have qualified as biodiversity offsets.  Two examples are: 
• Indicator 3-2-1:61  "Evidence is provided that any reasonably foreseeable future 
developments that might affect the offset, including developments by third parties, 
have been considered in the offset design."  Parts of the land benefitting from the 
Denniston Plateau pest control programme may be mined in the future; and 
• Criterion 5-1:62  "The conservation outcomes of the biodiversity offset shall be 
'additional' in that they are due to the offset activities and would not have occurred 
without them."  There is a risk that the pest control programmes will merely 
substitute for the DoC's expenditure on estate protection.  Further, it was argued 
that the area set aside for permanent protection was not at credible risk from 
mining because the coal beneath it was not economically recoverable.63 
Other criticisms of the Escarpment Mine Project offsets include:64 
• Poor measurability of the values to be offset.  It is clear that there were significant 
information gaps about the Denniston Plateau habitat that would be destroyed or 
damaged by the proposed development; 
• Uncertainty in restoration outcomes.  While animal pest control programmes are 
relatively well studied in New Zealand, the existing impact of animal pests on the 
Denniston Plateau and the outcomes of post-mining restoration were highly 
uncertain; and 
• Time lags.  In ecological terms, offsets should account for time-lags as 
equivalency cannot be achieved by compensating immediate loss by hypothetical 
equal gains in the future.  Again, the Escarpment Mine Project example is 
vulnerable to this criticism. 
A policy question arising from these criticisms is: how might the framework of the RMA be 
adapted to respond better and more predictably to proposed consent conditions described as 
biodiversity offsets?  It is suggested that, not only is the status quo sub-optimal (this is 
discuss further in part VI), but integrating biodiversity offsetting into the framework of the 
RMA in a principled way may encourage investment in the science and a gradual 
improvement of the available methodologies for adhering to those principles. 
                                                   
61  To No Net Loss and Beyond: An Overview of the Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme, 
above n 45, at 15. 
62  To No Net Loss and Beyond: An Overview of the Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme, 
above n 45, at 16. 
63  Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc v Buller District Council, above n 
31, at [79]–[89]. 
64  Refer to Maron and others, above n 37. 
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VI  Critique of the Status Quo 
This part sets out arguments in support of conclusions that the ways in which measures 
described as biodiversity offsets are currently taken into account under the RMA are 
inconsistent with generally accepted frameworks such as the BBOP, and allow offsets to be 
used as advocacy rather than objective tools to achieve no net loss. 
As noted in part IV, the RMA requires consent authorities to take measures described as 
biodiversity offsets into account as relevant considerations to be weighed in favour of 
applications by reason of s 104(1)(a) and (c), and s 5(2).  All discretionary and non-
complying activities are, in particular, ultimately measured against s 5.  With respect to that 
task, the Environment Court has held:65 
 The method of applying s 5 then involves an overall broad judgement of 
whether a proposal would promote the sustainable management of natural and 
physical resources.  That recognises that the [RMA] has a single purpose.  Such 
a judgment allows for comparison of conflicting considerations and the scale or 
degree of them, and their relative significance or proportion in the final 
outcome. 
Unlike the character of decision-making envisaged by frameworks like the BBOP (all 
residual adverse impacts on biodiversity being identified, measured and offset in accordance 
with detailed criteria), s 5 is inherently subjective.  The significant academic commentary on 
Part 2 of the RMA and the principle of sustainable management includes criticism of the 
"baffling complexity of s 5", including "the loosely guided discretion left with rule-makers 
and decision-makers, and the problem of weighing diverse competing interests where it is 
difficult to attribute to them comparative worth on a common value scale".66  An extensive 
review in 1997 of cases decided under the RMA concluded that:67 
 The dominant feature of the cases considering s 5 is the inconsistency of 
reasoning.  The non-specific language of s 5 provides an opportunity for 
flexibility in decision making, but the danger is that the complexity of the 
language will result in inconsistent and uncertain decisions. 
That conclusion was cited by I H Williams in support of his scathing view that the effect of 
the "broad overall judgement" approach to s 5 "is to render the concept of sustainable 
management virtually meaningless outside the facts, circumstances and nuances of a 
particular case.  … The legislature might almost as well have said that sustainable 
management means sugar and spice and all things nice."68  I H Williams' view was itself 
referred to by the Supreme Court in Environmental Defence Society Inc v The New Zealand 
King Salmon Company Ltd (King Salmon).69  I H Williams goes on to say in the same 
                                                   
65  North Shore City Council v Auckland Regional Council (1996) 2 ELRNZ 305 (EnvC) at 345–347. 
66  BV Harris “Sustainable Management as an Express Purpose of Environmental Legislation: The 
New Zealand Attempt” (1993) 8 Otago L Rev 51 at 52 and 73–76. 
67  Gordon Smith “The Resource Management Act 1991: ‘A Biophysical Bottom Line’ vs ‘A More 
Liberal Regime’; A Dichotomy?” (1997) 6 Canterbury L Rev 499 at 521. 
68  IH Williams “The Resource Management Act 1991: Well Meant But Hardly Done” (1997) 9 Otago 
L Rev 673 at 682. 
69  Environmental Defence Society Inc v New Zealand King Salmon Company Ltd [2014] NZSC 38 at 
[41]. 
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article that within the statutory elements of the RMA "practically any decision on a resource 
consent application will be defensible", and that applications are decided though "a mixture 
of art, science, justice and democracy".70 
It is suggested that the critique outlined above is, more or less, valid.  Thus, the shifting 
sands of s 5 are a poor foundation upon which to build a principled framework for 
biodiversity offsets.  While it is accepted that offsets currently offered under the RMA will 
start conversations about environmental compensation and are likely to enrich the 
engagement between applicants, consent authorities and submitters, they provide no 
certainty of substantive outcomes for the environment and risk becoming a way for 
applicants to better advocate in the context of s 5.  Similarly, while New Zealand may be 
better off in environmental terms with offsets than without them, the current approach is 
unlikely to achieve the goal of no net loss.  Continuing to treat biodiversity offsets as a 
consideration relevant to an "overall broad judgement" will do nothing to reduce (and may 
exacerbate) the uncertainties that are already inherent in the RMA. 
VII  The Future of Biodiversity Offsetting 
This part considers how the existing treatment of biodiversity offsets under the RMA could 
be improved by the promulgation of a national policy statement.  First, the law pertaining to 
such statements is examined with reference to the Supreme Court decision in King Salmon. 
A  King Salmon 
King Salmon, being one of four Supreme Court judgments following the High Court 
decision in Environmental Defence Society Inc v The New Zealand King Salmon Co Ltd,71 
concerned an application for changes to the Marlborough Sounds Resource Management 
Plan.72  The applicant sought to change salmon farming from a prohibited to a discretionary 
activity in eight locations.  A Board of Inquiry granted that application in relation to four of 
the proposed sites.  King Salmon was an appeal against the Board of Inquiry's decision in 
relation to one of the four sites – Papatua at Port Gore.   
Under s 67(3)(b) of the RMA, regional plans must give effect to any New Zealand coastal 
policy statement.  The appellant in King Salmon argued that, as a matter of law, the plan 
changes made by the Board of Inquiry did not comply with s 67 because they failed to give 
effect to particular polices of the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement (NZCPS).73 
Policy 13 of the NZCPS provided that, to "preserve the natural character of the coastal 
environment and to protect it from inappropriate … use, and development", local authorities 
should "avoid adverse effects of activities on natural character in areas of the coastal 
environment with outstanding natural character".  Policy 15 made similar provision for 
outstanding natural landscapes. 
                                                   
70  Williams, above n 68, at 692 endorsing in part the remarks of a third party. 
71  Environmental Defence Society Inc v The New Zealand King Salmon Co Ltd [2013] NZHC 1992, 
[2013] NZRMA 371. 
72  Marlborough District Council Marlborough Sounds Resource Management Plan (2003). 
73  "New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010" (4 November 2010) 148 New Zealand Gazette 
3710. 
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Although the Board of Inquiry had accepted that Papatua was an area of outstanding natural 
character and an outstanding natural landscape, and that the proposed salmon farm would 
have significant adverse effects, it did not consider that polices 13 and 15 of the NZCPS 
required the prohibition of salmon farming at Papatua.  In its decision, the Board of Inquiry 
held that:74 
 We are required to make an overall broad judgment as to whether the Plan 
Change would promote the single purpose of the RMA – the sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources.  As we have said earlier, Part II 
is not just the starting point but also the finishing point to be considered in the 
overall exercise of our discretion. 
This thinking was applied directly to the NZCPS, with the Board of Inquiry concluding that 
the "directions" it contained were ultimately "subservient to the Section 5 purpose of 
sustainable management".75 
The Supreme Court overturned the Board of Inquiry's approach.  In essence, it held that the 
NZCPS was clear and must be given effect to.  The Supreme Court considered that s 5 of 
the RMA should not be treated as the primary operative decision-making provision:76 
 Section 5 was not intended to be an operative provision, in the sense that it is 
not a section under which particular planning decisions are made; rather, it sets 
out the RMA's overall objective.  Reflecting the open-textured nature of pt 2, 
Parliament has provided for a hierarchy of planning documents the purpose of 
which is to flesh out the principles in s 5 and the remainder of pt 2 in a manner 
that is increasingly detailed both as to content and location.  It is these 
documents that provide the basis for decision-making, even though pt 2 remains 
relevant. 
Following the Court of Appeal in Auckland Regional Council v North Shore City Council77 
– a case which considered the imposition of boundaries to limit urban development by way 
of a regional policy statement – the Supreme Court also accepted that a policy may be 
"narrow and inflexible"78 to the point of having "the effect of what in ordinary speech would 
be a rule".79  
It is suggested that King Salmon makes it clear that environmental protection is an essential 
and legitimate element of the concept of sustainable management, and that policy-makers 
are entitled to impose environmental bottom lines in appropriate circumstances.  The notion 
of environmental bottom lines circles back to the debate canvassed in part VI.  The drafters 
                                                   
74  Board of Inquiry into the New Zealand King Salmon Proposal Final Report and Decision (22 
February 2013) at [1227]. 
75  Board of Inquiry into the New Zealand King Salmon Proposal, above n 74, at [1183]. 
76  Environmental Defence Society Inc v New Zealand King Salmon Company Ltd, above n 69, at 
[151]. 
77  Auckland Regional Council v North Shore City Council [1995] 3 NZLR 18 (CA). 
78  Environmental Defence Society Inc v New Zealand King Salmon Company Ltd, above n 69, at 
[182]. 
79  Environmental Defence Society Inc v New Zealand King Salmon Company Ltd, above n 69, at 
[116].   
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of the RMA did not necessarily intend for planning decisions to turn on a wide range of 
subjective and value-laden factors, which are "more moral and political than technical or 
scientific".80  Indeed, when introducing the Resource Management Bill for its third reading, 
Hon Simon Upton said that it should provide a framework for establishing objectives by 
reference to a "biophysical bottom line" set out in what is now s 5.81 
An opportunity arising from King Salmon is that the uncertainty of broad overall 
judgements under s 5 can be responded to with greater confidence by utilising the hierarchy 
of planning documents under the RMA to put in place environmental bottom lines (first, 
national environmental standards, national policy statements and New Zealand coastal 
policy statements; second, regional policy statements; third, regional plans; and fourth, 
district plans).  While King Salmon concerned the NZCPS, s 67(3) of the RMA provides 
that a regional plan must give effect to any national policy statement, which would include 
the PNPSIB should it be finalised and promulgated. 
B  PNPSIB 
The purpose of national policy statements is to state objectives and policies for matters of 
national significance that are relevant to achieving the purpose of the RMA.82  Local 
authorities are then, in general terms, required to amend their subordinate planning 
instruments to achieve consistency with any national policy statement.  The PNPSIB 
provides that the "matter of national significance to which this national policy statement 
applies is the need to maintain New Zealand's indigenous biological diversity".83  The 
regulatory impact statement for the PNPSIB acknowledges that the effectiveness of local 
authority efforts to protect and maintain indigenous biodiversity over the decade from 
2000–2010 has been inconsistent and inadequate.  This is "despite the clear signal that 
indigenous biodiversity is a matter of national importance".84  It then articulates the 
following three policy objectives:85 
 1. Ensure that significant indigenous vegetation and habitats outside 
public conservation lands are identified. 
 2. Provide baseline criteria for achieving the identification of 
significant indigenous vegetation and habitats outside public 
conservation lands. 
 3. Contribute to addressing the ongoing decline of indigenous 
biodiversity outside public conservation lands. 
It is the third objective that policies 5 and 6 of the PNPSIB respond to.  Policy 5, which is 
set out in full in part III, provides that local authorities "must" manage the effects of 
                                                   
80  Stephen Rivers-McCombs "Planning in Wonderland: The RMA, Local Democracy and the Rule of 
Law" (2011) 9 New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 43 at 65. 
81  (28 August 1990) 510 NZPD 3950. 
82  Resource Management Act 1991, s 45. 
83  Proposed National Policy Statement on Indigenous Biodiversity, above n 20, at 5. 
84  Ministry for the Environment Regulatory Impact Statement:  Proposed National Policy Statement 
on Indigenous Biodiversity (12 November 2010) at 2. 
85  Regulatory Impact Statement:  Proposed National Policy Statement on Indigenous Biodiversity, 
above n 84, at 6. 
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activities to "ensure 'no net loss' of biodiversity of areas of significant indigenous vegetation 
and significant habitats of indigenous fauna".  This is to be achieved by applying the 
hierarchy of avoid, remedy and mitigate, with any material residual adverse effects being 
offset.  Schedule 2 to the PNPSIB then sets out principles "to be applied when considering a 
biodiversity offset".  In contrast, policy 6 lists various measures that local authorities should 
merely "encourage" to "promote" the maintenance of biodiversity outside of identified areas 
of significant indigenous vegetation and significant habitats of indigenous fauna. 
Policy 5 attracted comments from 219 submitters on the PNPSIB.86  A primary concern of 
pro-environment submitters appears to have been a perception that a mitigation hierarchy 
that includes offsets will cause the RMA to become more permissive; particularly so given 
that the offsetting of "significant" vegetation and habitats is explicitly contemplated.  Pro-
development submitters appear to have been particularly wary of "no net loss" and the costs 
this might impose on the private sector. 
The Ministry for the Environment, which is responsible for the PNPSIB, described policy 5 
as "perhaps the most critical".87  This is true, although policy 5 depends on and its potential 
effectiveness is made vulnerable by the need to identify "significant" vegetation and 
habitats.  To the extent that a component of indigenous biodiversity is not identified as 
significant, it will fall under the much lesser protections offered by policy 6. 
Applying King Salmon, policy 5 of the PNPSIB does articulate an environmental bottom 
line in unambiguous language that subordinate planning instruments under the RMA would 
need to give effect to.  It also provides a framework and principles that consent authorities 
can apply to biodiversity offsetting.  In these respects the PNPSIB is, from a pro-
environment perspective, a significant step forward.  Some weaknesses of the PNPSIB are, 
however, addressed below with respect to achieving the goal of the New Zealand 
Biodiversity Strategy and no net loss of biodiversity in a wider sense. 
C  No Net Loss 
The goal of the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy includes sustaining modified ecosystems 
in production and urban environments; and doing what is necessary to maintain viable 
populations of all indigenous species. This is a wider objective than preserving (or 
offsetting) areas of significant vegetation and habitat.  Given this, one of the weaknesses of 
the PNPSIB is its restricted application.  The components of biodiversity that have intrinsic, 
economic and ecological value are not limited to areas deemed "significant".  Similarly, the 
importance of biodiversity to ecosystem functions is a system-wide phenomenon.  It is 
suggested that formalising and requiring the use of biodiversity offsetting in restricted 
circumstances may be a missed opportunity. 
As drafted, the PNPSIB will (through its implementation in subordinate planning 
instruments) result in a move away from the destruction of significant components of 
biodiversity being weighed as part of a broad overall judgement under s 5.  Instead, such 
destruction should be prohibited unless it can be offset in a way that is broadly consistent 
with international best practice (the principles in sch 2 to the PNPSIB are intended to 
                                                   
86  Ministry for the Environment Proposed National Policy Statement on Indigenous Biodiversity: 
Summary of Submissions (2011) at 59. 
87  Proposed National Policy Statement on Indigenous Biodiversity: Evaluation under section 32 of 
the Resource Management Act 1991, above n 21, at 65. 
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"replicate" those agreed through the BBOP88).  In contrast, the conventional approach to s 5 
will continue to apply where a discretionary or non-complying consent is required for the 
destruction of components of biodiversity not identified on a stand-alone basis as being 
significant; and applicants may continue to offer and have taken into account measures 
described as biodiversity offsets that ought not to be regarded as such.  It is also noteworthy 
that the PNPSIB states it will not apply to public conservation land (such as the site of the 
Escarpment Mine Project). 
As a consequence, it is suggested that the focus of the PNPSIB will provide only limited 
support for achieving a goal of no net loss in a wider sense.  It risks carving New Zealand 
up into pockets where development must not result in a backwards step; and the balance in 
which adverse effects on biodiversity may continue to be externalised. 
Despite the limited scope of no net loss under the PNPSIB, pro-development submissions 
on the PNPSIB included:89 
 [The concept of no net loss] risks overriding the overall RMA purpose of 
sustainable management of natural and physical resources.  The RMA is not a 
"no effects" statute designed to achieve environmental protection at all costs 
and, as stated above, the matters of national importance contained in section 6 
of the RMA are not "vetoes", but rather matters that must be considered when 
determining whether a particular application achieves the purpose of the Act 
(Auckland Airport, 12). 
 The proposed test of "no net loss" in the Policy is inconsistent with the 
sustainable management purpose of the RMA ... (New Zealand Transport 
Agency, 239). 
  ... the draft NPS makes no mention of sustainable management and in doing so, 
appears to extend the interpretation of the purpose of the Act from managing 
effects to 'doing no harm' … (Business NZ, 45). 
It is suggested in response that, in an already highly anthropogenic environment like New 
Zealand where biodiversity and ecosystem functions have been significantly degraded over 
time, planning laws may (and perhaps should) at some point move to requiring no more 
harm to be done to elements of the environment that are considered matters of national 
significance – such as maintaining indigenous biodiversity.  Given the enormity of the 
environmental challenges facing humankind and the inevitability of adverse effects on the 
environment, consideration should be given to using a national policy statement to set a 
much more ambitious environmental bottom line with respect to biodiversity and ecosystem 
functions.  Biodiversity offsetting (in the true, rigorous sense) could then be used as a tool 
for respecting that bottom line without moving from sustainable management to 
preservation. 
VIII  Conclusion 
Much has been written about biodiversity offsets: the principles underpinning the concept, 
the science and methodologies essential to its implementation, and in New Zealand, how 
                                                   
88  Proposed National Policy Statement on Indigenous Biodiversity: Evaluation under section 32 of 
the Resource Management Act 1991, above n 21, at 66. 
89  Proposed National Policy Statement on Indigenous Biodiversity: Summary of Submissions, above n 
86, at 67. 
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planning laws have taken into account measures described as biodiversity offsets.90  This 
paper has endeavoured to provide a review of the subject, but with a particular focus on how 
offsets could be used in the future to de-risk decisions made under the RMA and put in 
place an environmental bottom line in response to what is arguably a current or impending 
crisis of biodiversity (and relatedly, ecosystem function) loss.  It has concluded that the way 
in which consent authorities currently take offsets into account can be criticised as being 
somewhat of a 'black box'.  While the science behind biodiversity offsets is complex and 
still imprecise,91 offsets are a tool that may have an essential part to play in responding to 
the adverse effects of future use and development of the environment.  Relying on the 
discretion afforded by s 5 of the RMA makes it too easy at a human level to tip the scales in 
favour of developments that may have positive economic and social effects by using 
purported offsets to discount adverse effects on the environment.   
It is suggested that biodiversity offsets should not simply be left to the courts.  As the 
Environment Court (which considered the Escarpment Mine Project in the first instance) 
observed, while the hearing had been "used as a forum to settle vigorous technical scientific 
debates" between ecologists, the court "is neither a peer review panel nor an arbitrator 
between factions disputing scientific or computer modelling methodology.  It is a consent 
authority whose duties are set by the [RMA]", and include the need to "arrive at an overall 
broad judgement that serves the purpose of the Act as stated in s 5".92  Broad overall 
judgements are not the stuff of science and environmental bottom lines. 
The Supreme Court decision in King Salmon provides an opportunity to re-look at the role 
higher-order planning instruments under the RMA can and should play in shaping the 
country's future environment.   The PNPSIB is a start, but falls short of the holistic response 
to adverse effects on biodiversity that is arguably required.  It should be possible to put in 
place a framework that both requires local authorities to give effect to a policy of no net 
loss; and provides biodiversity offsetting as tool by which development and use of the 
environment can proceed without breaching that environmental bottom line. 
[Main body text excluding footnotes is 7,234 words.] 
                                                   
90  See for example Mark Christensen and Maree Baker-Galloway "Biodiversity offsets – The latest 
on the law" (Anderson Lloyd Lawyers, October 2013). 
91  Burgin, above n 18, at 811. 
92  West Coast Environmental Network Inc v West Coast Regional Council, above n 48, at [220]. 
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